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IN THE COURT OP APPEALS
OF
THE STATE OP UTAH

DOUGLAS J. ALLRED and
GEORGE S. DIUMENTI,
Plaintiffs and
Appellees,

Case No. 93-0815

vs.
LARRY H. BROWN and
ARTHUR J. RITTER,
Defendant and
Appellant

Priority No. 15

REPLY BRIEF
OF APPELLANT
LARRY H. BROWN
AN APPEAL FROM A FINAL JUDGMENT
ENTERED BY THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY
THE HONORABLE JAMES S. SAWAYA, PRESIDING.
(Case Below No. C-86-090-3354)
Defendant/appellant Larry H. Brown ("Brown") by and
through counsel, submits the following Reply Brief of
Appellant in response to the brief of plaintiffs/appellees
Douglas J. Allred and George S. Diumenti (collectively
"Diumenti").

RESPONSE TO DIUMENTI'S
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
I.

Statement of Issues
The issues as raised by Diumenti's brief and responded

to herein are properly stated as:
1. Is the trial court prevented from finding Brown
liable for damages to the airplane pursuant to an allegedly
expressed term of a bailment agreement between Diumenti and
Brown, specifying that Brown obtain insurance for the
airplane, when the trial court had already concluded that no
contract of any type existed between Diumenti and Brown
because according to Diumenti's own admissions, all of
Diumenti's dealings concerning the airplane were with
defendant Ritter?
2. Is the trial court prevented from finding Brown
liable for damages to the airplane pursuant to an alleged
bailment agreement without a determination that Brown was
negligent as required by Utah common law and the instructions on remand given by this Court?
3. Is the trial court prevented from finding Brown
liable for damages to the airplane pursuant to an alleged
bailment agreement when, for the same reasons that there was
insufficient evidence to establish an expressed, implied or
quasi contract between Diumenti and Brown there is insufficient evidence to establish a bailment agreement between
the two?
II.

Standard of Review
Brown's response to Diumenti's brief raises purely

legal issues.

As a result, this Court should not defer to

the trial court's conclusions concerning these issues and
should review its determinations for correctness.
BMG Corp.. 700 P.2d 1068, 1070 (Utah 1985).

1

Scharf v.

RESPONSE TO DIUMENTI'S STATEMENT OF FACTS
To response to Diumenti's statement of the facts, Brown
primarily relies upon the ruling that the lower court made
after Diumenti presented his case in chief at trial —
11

that

[b]y Mr. Diumenti's own admission" there was no contract of

any sort between Diumenti and Brown —

specifically that

there was no agreement regarding insurance for the airplane.
Primary Transcript at 73-74.

Because all dealings,

negotiations and agreements regarding the airplane took
place between Diumenti and Ritter exclusively, the trial
court dismissed Diumenti's breach of contract claim against
Brown.

As Diumenti's counsel conceded, "I think Mr.

Diumenti's testimony was unequivocal that his agreement
specifically was with Mr. Ritter."

Id.

Indeed, when Diumenti's counsel argued at trial that "I
think there was no1 collateral agreement with Mr. Brown that
the plane wouldn't be flown unless —
the airplane unless he made —

that he would not fly

found the appropriate rider

from the insurance company," the trial court discarded this
argument as well:
That doesn't square with your pleadings. You
would have to — you would want to amend your
pleadings to conform with the evidence. You are
[now] claiming there was agreement entered May 8
with both these parties that they would provide
insurance coverage for any losses occasioned to
that aircraft Cessna 414.
1

Diumenti now chooses to interpret this "no" in the
transcript as an "an", completely changing the meaning of
the sentence. Diumenti's Brief at 15.
2

Because there was no such agreement on May 8 —
before the crash —

the day

between Diumenti and Brown concerning

providing insurance for the airplane, the trial court
concluded that "[t]he motion to dismiss as to Mr. Brown, the
first cause of action [the contract claim] will be granted."
As this Court determined, because the lower court
dismissed the cause of action for breach of contract against
Brown at trial, the principles of justice prevent Diumenti
for asserting this claim again.

Memorandum Decision of this

Court at 3-4, exhibit "a" attached to Brown7s Brief.

The

trial court already ruled that no agreement existed obligating Brown "to insure and maintain insurance on the aircraft in favor of plaintiffs" and therefore Brown was not
liable to Diumenti for any failure to "obtain insurance."
Diumenti's Complaint at 1-2 (First Cause of Action), exhibit
"1" attached to Brown's Brief.

The trial court ruled that

Brown was not responsible for "a breach of [the] agreement
with plaintiffs" to obtain insurance.

Id.

Relying upon the trial court's ruling and this Court's
insistence that Brown is not liable to Diumenti for a breach
of contract concerning insurance for the airplane, Brown
responds to Diumenti's statement of facts as follows:

Brown's Response to J 3:

Diumenti misleadingly

portrays Brown's role in the management of Mercury Air
Courier Service ("Mercury").

While Brown did help run the
3

company, his position was that of "operations officer."
Primary Trial Transcript at 5-6.

Brown's job was to fly the

company's airplanes while Ritter, as the business manager of
Mercury, took care of the routine business functions of the
company, including "contracting for aircraft" for the
company to use.

Id. at 77.

Accordingly, the trial court

concluded that as operations manager and pilot of the
airplane, Brown was not party to any contract concerning the
leasing of or obtaining insurance for the aircraft.
Brown's Response to ^ 6:

Diumenti misleads this Court

when he suggests that Brown was a party to the informal
discussions in Ritter's living room at which insurance for
the airplane was discussed in any more that the most general
terms.

Although insurance was discussed at this preliminary

meeting, Brown repeatedly emphasized that the conversation
there was general and uncertain and that no details were
worked out.

Primary Transcript at 3 5-3 6.

Thus, any quotes

from Brown's testimony concerning this meeting must be
qualified with the witness' further testimony that the
discussions were only in the most general terms and the
trial court's determination that no contract —
implied, or quasi —

expressed,

existed between Diumenti and Brown.

Brown's Response to J 7:

Furthermore, Diumenti

testified that the agreement reached at the meeting was
"that Mr. Ritter would lease the aircraft in consideration - the consideration that he would pay would be as follows:"
4

Partial Transcript at 10 (emphasis added).

Diumenti also

stated that his discussion were "predominately with Mr.
Ritter" and that "Mr. Ritter was the lessee" of the
airplane, Id. at 33, and that "[t]he lease wasn't, in my
understanding, was not with Mr. Brown, that's correct" and
that "Mr. Brown essentially said, xI'm going to be flying
the plane for Mr. Ritter.'"

Id. at 52. Diumenti's testi-

mony continually supports the determination of the trial
court that Diumenti's contract claim against Brown was
without merit.
Brown's Response to 5 8:

Diumenti misdirects this

Court by implying that the statement he quotes refers to
some agreement between himself and Brown.

Importantly,

immediately before giving the testimony at issue, Diumenti
confirmed that Mr. Ritter was the lessee of the airplane and
Mr. Ritter "was the one that was going to comply with the
terms of the lease and pay the hundred dollars an hour."
Partial Transcript at 33. Diumenti also stated at trial
that it was his understanding (rather than the understanding
of "the parties" as Diumenti now represents in 5 8) that
"the basis upon which . . . [he] was willing to lease the
aircraft was [that] the individual for Mr. Ritter that would
be flying the aircraft would be added to our policy. . . . "
Id.

This statement underscores that Diumenti believed that

Brown had no role in the lease of the aircraft.

Brown was

not even specifically named in the discussion and was
5

referred to only as Ritter's agent —

the one who would fly

the airplane.
Brown's Response to 5 9:

Diumenti misleads this Court

when he gives significance to his testimony that Brown
"acknowledged" "what he had to do to get his waiver on that
policy . .

."

Actually, Diumenti testified that Brown

never told him that Brown would do anything concerning
getting insurance for the airplane.

While Diumenti testi-

fied that Brown said he would be the only person to fly the
airplane, Diumenti also agreed that Brown never stated that
Brown would have any other part in the fulfillment of the
terms of the lease.

Partial Transcript at 50-51.2

Diumenti

emphasized again that it was "absolutely correct" that any
2

The testimony at issue was:

Q: Okay. Now, the meeting on the 29th at
Ritter's house, during that meeting did Mr. Brown
make any representations to you that he would do
anything as part of the lease?
A (Diumenti): Yes. That he would be the only
person to fly the aircraft after being added to
the policy.
Q: Anything else?
A: Anything else he would do?
Q: Correct.
A: No, sir.
Q: Mr. Brown didn't say to you, "I'll go get the
rider and get insurance coverage?
A: He didn't say that in those words. He said he
understood what he had to do to get his waiver on
that policy, just like Paul Johnson, one of his
pilot acquaintances, had done.
Q: Okay. So Mr. Brown said he understood. My
question to you, though, is did Mr. Brown say,
"I'll do that"?
A: On Sunday he didn't say he would do that.
Partial Transcript at 50-51.
6

lease concerning the airplane was with Ritter, not Brown.
Id. at 52.
Brown's Response to J 14:

Diumenti misguides this

Court when he takes this portion of Brown's testimony out of
context.

After confirming that Mercury required written

agreements for all the aircraft which it leased, Brown was
asked whether he knew "the arrangements had been worked out
with regard to the repairs" that were made on the airplane.
Brown replied that he knew of the agreement concerning the
repairs only in general terms because it was Ritter's duty
as business agent to take care of the details of the
arrangement for repairing the airplane.

Thus, when Brown

replied that he had no reason to doubt that there was an
enforceable oral agreement in effect at the time the
airplane was being repair, he was referring to an agreement
concerning repairs —

not concerning the lease of the

aircraft or providing insurance.
Brown's Response to 5 16:

Full Transcript at 225.
Diumenti misleads this Court

when he cites the Finding of Fact from the first trial court
ruling to assert that Ritter and Brown "expressly agreed to
take steps to be added to plaintiff's insurance coverage or
to provide their own coverage, which they failed to do."
Diumenti cites the decision and findings of the trial which
dealt with the issue of a contract between the parties
concerning the airplane and which was explicitly overturned
by this Court with regard to Brown.
7

As this Court concluded

in the first appeal, the trial "court erred when, after dismissing the first cause of action for breach of contract, it
concluded that Brown was liable to plaintiffs for breach of
contract."

Memorandum and Decision of this Court at 3.

Brown's Response to 5 209 [sic]:
-- with an air of disbelief —

While Diumenti quotes

Brown's statements that Brown

assumed that the airplane was insured and that he did not
inquire as to whether the airplane was insured, Diumenti
does not cite or quote any passage from his testimony (nor
does such a passage exist) that Diumenti, like Brown, did
anything more than assume that the airplane was insured or
that Diumenti ever inquired as to whether the airplane was
insuredo
INTRODUCTION
In his opening brief, Brown showed that the trial court
erred when it determined that Brown was liable for damage to
the airplane pursuant to a bailment that included an express
agreement to obtain insurance for the airplane.

As Brown

demonstrated, the ruling was wrong because 1) the trial
court could not find Brown a party to an expressed insurance
provision pursuant to a bailment agreement when it had
already determined that no contract existed between Diumenti
and Brown —

much less an expressed agreement; 2) the trial

court could not find Brown liable for damage to the airplane
under a bailment theory because it did not follow this
Court's instructions and the requirements of Utah common law
8

that it make a finding of Brown's negligence before holding
him liable for damage to the airplane; 3) there is insufficient evidence to show that any expressed agreement concerning insurance existed between Diumenti and Brown; and
finally, 4) Diumenti offered no evidence that Brown was
negligent and Brown proved that he exercised the requisite
care of the airplane, the trial court could not hold Brown
liable for damages to the aircraft.
In reply to these points, Diumenti relies on the fruitless argument that by reserving Diumenti's third cause of
action —

his bailment claim —

the trial court could still

make a finding that an expressed insurance agreement existed
between Diumenti and Brown even though the trial court had
already ruled that no agreement existed between Diumenti and
Brown.

Because the general common law duties of parties to

a bailment can be altered by an express term, Diumenti
argues, an express agreement between Diumenti and Brown
makes Brown liable for damages to the airplane even though
the he was not negligent.

Diumenti argues that simply

because the trial court did not rule on the bailment claim
at trial, that it reserved the option to again contradict
its prior ruling and determine that an alleged bailment
between the parties included an expressed insurance agreement.

9

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
As Brown demonstrates conclusively below, Diumenti's
arguments fail.

First, Diumenti ignores a central principle

of the law of bailments.

Although an expressed agreement

between the parties to a bailment can alter their duties as
fixed by law, such an agreement must be expressed in "clear
and unmistakable language" and must be assented to by both
parties.

Accordingly, the failure of a bailee to obtain

agreed upon insurance is considered a breach of contract.
As a result, absent a precise and indisputable contract that
the bailee is to obtain insurance, the courts will not hold
the bailee liable for damage caused to the bailed property
unless she is negligent.
This tenet of the common law of bailments readily shows
Diumenti's error.

The trial court dismissed Diumenti's

breach of contract claim against Brown because there was
insufficient dealings and understandings between Diumenti
and Brown to create an agreement.

Given this reasoning, the

trial court necessarily dismissed the possibility that there
was a clear and distinct expressed agreement —
assented to by Diumenti and Brown —
obtain insurance for the airplane.

mutually

that the latter would
Where there is no

contract of any sort, there cannot be a clear and unmistakable agreement, mutually assented to by the contracting
parties, concrete enough to impose an obligation on Brown
contrary to that fixed by law.
10
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cannot rule that Brown is liable for damages to the bailed
property.

For these reason, all of Diumenti's claims

against Brown should be dismissed.
Brown demonstrates each of these points in detail
below.
ARGUMENT
I. By Dismissing Diumenti's Breach of Contract Claim
Against Brown, The Trial Court Necessarily Ruled That There
Could Not Be An Expressed Insurance Agreement Between Them.
A. The Trial Court Ruled That No Agreement Was Made Between
Diumenti And Brown Because Diumenti Bargained With Ritter
Exclusively.
At trial, the lower court dismissed Diumenti's breach
of contract claim against Brown, concluding that there was
no enforceable contract between Diumenti and Brown.3
3

The

There is some suggestion in the transcript that the
trial court ruled only that there was no express contract
between Diumenti and Brown and that because Diumenti had not
plead a breach of an implied contract, the breach of contract claim was meritless as against Brown. This interpretation of the trial court ruling does not make sense. A
breach of contract claim can be founded on an expressed,
implied, or quasi contract regardless of whether the plaintiff specified in her complaint which type of contract
formed the basis of defendant's legal obligations. Thus,
when the trial court dismissed Diumenti's contract claim
against Brown, it dismissed the possibility that any type of
bargain or agreement concerning insurance existed between
the two.
Furthermore, this distinction is largely academic
since, as Brown demonstrates below, a bailor and a bailee
must expressly agree to alter their common law duties under
the bailment relationship. It is clear, at least, that the
trial court dismissed the claim that Diumenti entered into
an express agreement with Brown. Thus, even if the trial
court reserved the possibility that an implied agreement
existed between Diumenti and Brown, any such agreement would
not be sufficiently robust to permit a deviation for the
legal obligations imposed by common law on parties to a
12
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4
breach of contract claim against Brown during trial, in its
first Memorandum Decision after trial, it found that Ritter
and Brown had breached the oral contract to obtain insurance
for the aircraft. The relevant portion of the Memorandum
Decision of the Trial Court reads:
•

•

2. The oral agreement between the parties was
that defendants agreed either to take steps to be
added to plaintiff's insurance, or to obtain their
own insurance policy, either of which would
provide coverage for their use of the aircraft,
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the claim that Diumenti had entered into an oral contract
with Brown, the trial court determined that Brown had no
enforceable obligation to obtain insurance for the airplane.
Because a contract is an agreement enforceable in law which
assigns obligation to the parties of the contract, the trial
court determined that no such understanding and no such
obligation existed between Diumenti and Brown.

B. In Order To Alter Their Prescribed Duties Under A
Bailment, The Bailor And Bailee Must Clearly And Unmistakably Contract To Modify Their Legal Relationship.
Well settled law mandates that, unless otherwise
obligated by express contract, a bailee is not an insurer of
the safety of goods delivered into her keeping.
Decision of this Court at 3, citing

Memorandum

Sumsion v. Streator-

Smith, Inc. 103 Utah 44, 132 P.2d 680, 685-686 (1943);
Barlow Upholstery & Furniture v. Emmel, 533 P.2d 900, 901
(Utah 1975) ("bailee has a duty to exercise reasonable care
and caution commensurate with acceptance of the responsibility of safekeeping

the property of others entrusted to

3. Defendants breached the agreement to provide
insurance as required. . . .
Memorandum Decision of the Trial Court at 2.
On appeal, this Court reversed that decision, ruling
that the dismissal of the breach of contract claim against
Brown during trial constituted an adjudication of the matter
and precluded the trial court from finding Brown liable on
the contract theory resurrected after trial.
14
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Co. , 213 P.2d 6 6 7 (Utah 19 5 0 ) ,
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S outhern P a c i f . c

T h e Coi irt n o t e d t h a t

t h e p a r t i e s m a y enter into a val id a g r e e m e n t to
m o d i f y t h e o b l i g a t i o n s which wou \s\ o t h e r w i s e a r i s e
^ See also,
Brown's Brief at 28-11 where this point is
argued extens ively.

from the relationship of bailor and bailee if [the
agreement] *does not violate the law or contravene
public policy, and so long as it is actually a
part of the contract of bailment and is expressed
in clear and unmistakable language.'
Id. at 668, quoting

6 Am. Jur.

Bailments,

§ 176.

Understandably, the courts require that, to be enforceable, an agreement which alters the legal duties of the
bailor and bailee by requiring the bailee to insure the
property at issue, must be an actual contract.

Thus, when a

contract precisely and undoubtedly calls for the bailee to
insure the bailed property, and he fails to do so, the
bailor can recover only on the basis of a breach of contract
claim.

For example, once a bailee has fulfilled her obli-

gation to insure, she is not responsible for any deficiency
occurring because, for example, of the insolvency of insurance company.

Williamson v. Phillipoff, 64 So.

269 (Fla.

1914); Re Farmers State Bank. 289 N.W. 75 (S.D. 1939); see
also

Texas Van Lines v. Godfrey, 313 S.W.2d 922 (Tex. Ct.

App. 1958) (liability not predicated on theory that bailee
was insurer of property, but on theory that bailee breached
its contract to obtain insurance coverage); 8 Am.Jur.
Bailments

2d,

§ 216.

Examination of the applicable case law proves that a
bailee's failure to fulfill a binding promise to obtain
insurance is a breach of contract.

For example, in Texas

Van Lines, plaintiffs recovered only the amount of the
promised insurance coverage rather than the actual value of
16
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C. Having Already Ruled That There Was No Contract Between
Diumenti and Brown, The Trial Court Could Not Find That The
Parties Agreed To Alter Their Duties As Defined By The Law
of Bailments.
Under the law of bailments, an agreement to alter the
legally

6

impor.pd ilwti»»! »>1' 'nilur -.v"i hii IG':> must I.'*.1 a

Worthy of note i n th is action is the lack of any
suggestion as to the amount insurance Brown was allegedly to
be required to secure for the plane. Alternatively, was
Brown only suppose to be added as a named pilot to
Diumenti's insurance policy? For example,
Findings of Fact
of Trial Court at J 3, exhibit lfc" attached to Brown's
Brief; Memorandum Decision of Trial Court at f 2, exhibit
"b" attached to Brown's Brief. Absent an express and clear
agreement, the common law duties of a bailment are not to be
expanded or enlarged. The terms of alleged agreement as to
insurance was not clear — was Brown to secure insurance or
merely be added to Diumenti's policy?

contract.7

Like a contract, such an agreement must be clear

and distinct and mutually agreed to by the parties.
Furthermore, because the common law assumes a certain
relationship between the bailor and the bailee —

that the

bailee is not the insurer of the bailed property —- the
courts will not lightly impose additional duties upon the
bailee.

Finally, any claim that the bailee failed to

insured the bailed property as promised must be plead as a
breach of contract.
These legal principles show that there is nothing about
a bailment relationship which suddenly obviates or lessens
the burden of the complaining party to show that a true
meeting of the minds existed and a legal obligation was
created, before she can recover on the basis of an alteration of the ordinary bailment agreement.

As established

above, an agreement to require the bailee to insure the
bailed property cannot be implied —

it must be clear and

expressed.
Accordingly, under the law of bailments, Diumenti is
precluded from recovering from Brown on the basis of an
expressed agreement between the parties that Brown obtain

A contract is fl[a]n agreement . . . which creates an
obligation to do or not to do a particular thing. . . . Its
essentials are competent parties, subject matter, a legal
consideration, mutuality of agreement and mutuality of obligation." Black's
Law Dictionary
(5th edition).
18
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Because the trial court already
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party to any contract concerning insurance and that Diumenti
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enter i nto a con trac t: the tri a] • ::: ourt
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8

Brown has argued extensively that, for the same
reasons that the trial court determined that there was no
contract between Diumenti and Brown, there is insufficient
evidence to establish a bailment between the two, .See,
Brown's Brief at 21-23.
9 ,jijie t r i a l c o u r t c l e a r l y u n d e r s t o o d D i u m e n t i # s b r e a c h
of contract claim as involving the same elements and e v i dence that his bailment evidence involved. Thus, before the
first appeal, the trial court found, holding Brown liable
for breach of contract, that the "oral agreement between the
parties was that defendants agreed either to take steps to
be added to plaintiff's insurance, or to obtain their own
insurance policy, either of which would provide coverage for
their use of the aircraft. 11 First Memo, and Dec. at 2.
After remand, the trial court merely plugged the word
"bailment" into its previous holding, stating that "under
the bailment, there was an express agreement between the
parties that defendants would obtain insurance to cover the

II. Giving Preclusive Effect To The Ruling That There Was
No Insurance Agreement Between Diumenti and Brown and
Requiring A Finding Of Negligence To Hold Brown Liable Under
a Bailment Theory Is Consistent With This Court's Prior
Ruling And The Ruling At Trial.
Diumenti makes much of his argument that, because the
trial court specifically reserved ruling on his bailment
claim when it dismissed the breach of contract claim against
Brown, it was free to subsequently determine Diumenti and
Brown entered into a contract that expanded Brown's
liability beyond that assumed by the law.
fails for two reasons.

This argument

First, it ignores the instructions

on remand given by this court that the trial court make a
finding of negligence before it imposes liability on Brown
under a bailment theory.

On the first appeal, this Court

rejected Diumenti7s argument that the trial court had based
its ruling on his bailment claim rather than his previously
dismissed breach of contract claim by stating:
We recognize that the "relationship [between]
bailor and bailee is created in contract." The
[trial] court, however, did not refer to bailment
in its memorandum decision, findings, or conclusions. Moreover, the court did not make any
findings or conclusions concerning negligence
which is the basis for liability in a cause of
action for bailment.
Memorandum Decision of this Court at 2-3, (emphasis added,
citations omitted), exhibit "a" attached to Brown's Brief.

airplane during the time the airplane was in the defendants
[sic] possession." Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
of Trial Court at 3.
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* Oddly, Diumenti suggests that because Brown did
present evidence concerning bailment after the dismissal of
the contract claim, he would not be prejudiced by the trial
court's reversal its previous ruling of no contract.
Diumenti's Brief at 17. However, Diumenti forgets that an
expressed agreement which alters the bailment relationship
is a contract. Thus, in reliance upon the trial court's
dismissal, Brown did not offer evidence that he was not a
party to an express agreement expanding his liability beyond
the legally defined limits of a bailment relationship
Brown would therefore be prejudiced i f the tri al court's
present ruling is allowed to stand.

Finally, Diumenti ignores the obvious conclusion that
the trial court refused to dismiss Diumenti's bailment claim
against Brown at the same time it dismissed his breach of
contract claim because the trial court was undecided on the
issue of negligence.

Full Transcript at 75. n

Because it

was uncertain on the issue of negligence, the trial court
deferred any decision concerning bailment until it could
determine the care with which Brown operated the airplane.
Thus, Diumenti,s argument fails.

Given this Court's

prior ruling, the law of bailments, the principles of
judicata

res

and issue preclusion, and the absence of a showing

that Brown was negligent, this Court should reject all
claims against Brown.

Having dismissed Brown from liability

on the basis of an expressed insurance contract, the trial
court cannot find him liable for a breach of an alleged
agreement to secure insurance for the airplane.

CONCLUSION
Based on the arguments above and Brown's previously
submitted Brief of Appellant, this Court should reverse the
trial court's ruling and should order dismissal of all of

11

In response to Brown's motion to dismiss the bailment and negligence claims against him, the trial court
stated that, although "I am not sure I could find any
negligence on the basis of the evidence as it now stands . .
. . I am going to deny your motion I think . . . and consider whether or not there's [sic] reasonable inferences
that — I am leaning more toward your position quite frankly
but let me just consider it." Id.
22
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bailment or for negligence.IS
DATED this 21st day of JUNE, *J^*.
UTAH LEGAL CLINIC
Attorneys for Brown
Appellant/Defendant

BRIAN M. BARNARD
JORO WALKER
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In his Brief at 2 6-3 0, Brown argued
trial court ruled that there was no express
between Diumenti and Brown, the court could
the parties altered their obligations under
bailment agreement.

that because the
agreement
not find that
an ordinary

Memorandum Dec is i oi i :xl: !::]: :i i s C : r\ ir t: a t: 3 ; s e e a 1 so
Brown's Brief at 3 0-3 3.
1l
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